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Abstract
There is a well-documented indication that several applications would benefit
from the transparency afforded by argumentation to support decision-making
where standard decision theory is not useful, e.g. in healthcare. However, to
date, research on argumentation-based decision making has only been partially
successful in realising its promise. In our view this is predominantly due to
its lack of theoretical validation in the form of rationality properties and its
disregard for the interplay between individual rationality and social good when
used in collaborative settings. We discuss how to address these challenges for
the promise of argumentation-based decision-making to be fully realised as a
principled mechanism for transparent and rational decision-making.
Context
Argumentation, initially studied in philosophy and law [20, 16], has been researched
extensively in AI and Computer Science in the last two decades [2, 18]. Simply stated,
argumentation focuses on interactions where parties plead for and against some con-
clusion. In its most abstract form [6], an argumentation framework consists simply of
a set of arguments and a binary relation representing the attacks between the argu-
ments, and corresponds to a directed graph (args, attacks), where args is the set of
arguments and attacks ⊆ args × args. By instantiating the notion of arguments and
the attack relations, different ‘structured’ argumentation frameworks can be obtained,
predominantly based on logic, within which arguments have a concrete structure and
attacks are determined on the basis of this structure. For example, in assumption-
based argumentation [7], arguments are obtained recursively from a given set of logical
rules and are supported by these rules and assumptions. Also, an argument attacks
another if the former supports a claim conflicting with some assumption in the latter,
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where conflicts are given in terms of the notion of contrary of assumptions. Rules,
assumptions and contraries are defined in terms of an underlying logical language.
Within argumentation framework (of abstract or structured form) attacks represent
conflicts between arguments, which in turn provide abstractions of conflicts between
conflicting views of an individual or clashes between views of different individuals. Ar-
gumentation frameworks are equipped with methods (typically referred to as ‘seman-
tics’) for determining winning arguments, and thus resolve the underlying conflicts.
Argumentation provides a powerful mechanism for dealing with incomplete, pos-
sibly inconsistent information and for the resolution of conflicts and differences of
opinion amongst different parties. Further, it is useful for justifying outcomes. Thus,
argumentation can, in principle, support several aspects of decision-making [19], either
by individual entities performing critical thinking (needing to evaluate pros and cons of
conflicting decisions) or by multiple entities dialectically engaged to come to mutually
agreed decisions (needing to assess the validity of information the entities become aware
of and resolve conflicts), especially when decisions need to be transparently justified
(e.g. in healthcare).
Argumentation-based decision-making is a form of qualitative decision theory (e.g. see
[5]), understood as an alternative to classical quantitative decision theory when a de-
cision problem cannot be easily or usefully formulated in standard decision-theoretic
terms using decision tables, utility functions and probability distributions. Argumen-
tation has been proposed for decision-making under certainty (where the outcomes of
decisions are known to the decision maker), e.g. in [12, 13], strict uncertainty (where
the outcomes of decisions are uncertain and no probabilistic information is available),
e.g. in [1] and [9], and also for decision under risk (where some probabilistic information
is known), e.g. in [15, 8]. In all these settings argumentation is used in the context of
individual decision-making. In addition, argumentation has been advocated to support
collaborative decision-making (e.g. in [11]), where different decision-makers interact to
reach jointly agreed decisions or separate but compatible individual decisions.
Challenges
Argumentation-based decision-making is empowered by highly transparent methods.
Indeed, argumentation affords a transparent depiction of the detailed logical structure
of arguments and conflicts between them, and argumentation semantics provide a trans-
parent way to resolve these conflicts. However, argumentation-based decision-making
predominantly lacks means of formally evaluating decisions as rational. Moreover,
when decision-making is collaborative amongst different parties and stakeholders, the
interplay between individually and socially rational decisions needs to be fully under-
stood and strategic behaviour of individual parties towards individual good and away
from social good needs to be controlled.
2
Transparent versus rational decisions
Standard decision theory is well studied as a mechanism for rational choice, but has
paid little attention to the structure and content of reasons brought to bear to sup-
port or argue against given choices, as pointed out, for example, in [4]. Indeed, in
standard decision theory, the outcomes of choices are typically assigned values which
are then treated as embodying a cardinal or ordinal preference relation, with decision
rules identifying good choices according to various decision criteria and under differing
conditions of circumstantial knowledge (certainty, strict uncertainty, risk). We believe
that a ‘normative’ analysis of argumentation-based decision-making, in terms of ratio-
nality criteria similar (in spirit at least) to those studied in standard decision-theory,
is essential for argumentation-based decision-making to become a convincing, widely
usable transparent as well as rational mechanism and have, as a result, a fruitful im-
pact on applications. This normative analysis may beneficially draw also from the vast
literature in AI on formal theories of defeasible reasoning in the presence of various
forms of priorities and postulates regulating the outcomes of this form of reasoning
(e.g. see [3, 10]. Indeed, the support that argumentation gives to a decision is in gen-
eral defeasible: if a stronger, conflicting argument is present, then a weaker argument
may be rejected.
Individual versus collaborative decision-making
Mechanism design in economics [14] is a well-developed framework for studying (and
identifying conditions for avoiding) strategic behaviour of interacting individuals with
conflicting preferences, with some early promise in the context of argumentation [17].
We believe that collaborative argumentation-based decision-making would benefit (if
not require) a mechanism design analysis and formulation to guarantee the social ra-
tionality of decisions and control the strategic behaviour of individually rational stake-
holders. We also believe that a novel normative perspective for argumentation-based
dialogues between agents is needed to ascertain the rationality of collaborative decisions
and strategic aspects of dialogues.
An example in healthcare
Consider the case of two physicians taking a decision about a cancer patient on whether
to prescribe drug a or b, in the presence of two clinical trials, one of which recommends
cancer drug a over b on the grounds that, whilst there is no significant difference in their
effects on disease-free survival, a brings markedly lower risks of alopecia. The second
clinical trial shows a very slightly higher probability of disease-free survival with b
compared to a, and no difference in the likelihood of alopecia. However, the first
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trial involved 40 patients who were followed for 5 years; the second trial involved 100
patients for 20 years. Here, there is a partial order over outcomes (perhaps involving
some aggregation of orders over different attributes), but there is also an ordering—
derived, in this instance, from the differing longevity and size of the trials—over the
strength of the reasons afforded to choose drug a or b. Assume also that one of the
physicians has a personal preference for drug a, and that the other has no knowledge of
the second clinical trial. This decision-making problem requires for the physicians to
share information (possibly against their personal preferences) and come to an agreed
rational decision taking into account all factors, and transparent in being explainable
to each other and the patient.
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